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Statement of the Problem: To draw up the specifications for the physical type of a repository and the specifications of its site.

Discussion

The primary consideration is to have available for immediate use documents vital to the intelligence effort in the prosecution of the war.

To determine the area of search, other considerations of lesser importance are the availability of communications, monetary considerations, secrecy of the establishment, and its locations, availability of transportation, proximity to possible targets of enemy action, movement to another location closer to the new seat of government or a centralized intelligence center, physical working facilities and conditions, and possibility of expansion.

To determine the physical type of the repository, items to be considered are the anticipated war-time mission of CIA; the reestablishment of a headquarters from which CIA can operate, satisfactory physical protection, possibility of expansion to operating size or movement to another location.

In exploring the problem the sub-committee discussed underground installations vis-a-vis dispersion with pertinent persons in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army (charged with surveying the United States for underground installations for industry and the military.) A copy of "Progress Report No. 3, Underground Installations Program" date 30 November 1947 published by the Chief of Engineers was studied. The Office, Chief Signal Officer, U. S. Army was contacted and emergency communications measures discussed. Decentralization planning of the National Military Establishment was also discussed with Plans and Operations Division, U. S. Army. In arriving a t the following conclusions the pertinent conversations were given appropriate weight.

The sub-committee believes that the area to be searched should be outside the industrial quadrangle Kansas City, Mo. - Sault Ste. Marie Mich. - Portland, Me. - Knoxville, Tenn, This area contains 68% of U. industrial establishments, employs 76% of the industrial wage earners, and provides 76% of the produced value. The industry of the United States is the back-bone of the U. S. war potential and is therefore vulnerable to attack at any point. It is within the industrial area that communications, transportation and housing facilities are most tax in time of an emergency. Coastal points are also vulnerable from sea-borne

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TAB (C)

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The sub-committee believes that **Stiffed** security from surprise attack can be derived by geographical placement of the site and the use of vault type storage room(s) rather than by putting the whole operation underground. This decision was reached after assessing the two solutions against the requirement of maintaining secrecy of the location; consideration of the possibility of expansion from a repository to an operating entity; possible requirement of moving to some other location nearer to the seat of government; the expense; and living and working conditions.

The sub-committee believes that the repository, then, should be located in a city of population above 200,000. This decision was reached after consideration of availability of appropriate type buildings from which to choose; the availability of communications, transportation, housing, and equipment; the ability of the community, if necessary, to absorb an increase of 2000 to 3500 in working population; and the maintenance of secreey of location.

It is not desirable that the city be more than 600 miles from Washington.

The expense of courier service to and from CIA., Washington during the interim period being the main factor in this decision.

It is desirable to have the repository near to an Army establishment. Physical protection against armed or sabotage attack; the fact that the CIA war-time function will be to support the national intelligence effort - then largely military; and the availability of communications and transportation facilities are the primary factors considered. The Army establishment should not, however, be of such importance as to make it a profitable enemy target. The Headquarters of the Zone of the Interior Armies appear to meet all of these requirements.

By eliminating sea ports and all the cities of over 200,000 within the industrial quadrangle, Atlanta, Ga., Dallas, Tex., Denver, Colo., Milwaukoe, Wis., Minneapolis, Minn., Oklahoma City, Okla., Omaha, Nebr., Portland, Ore., St. Paul, Minn., and San Antonio, Texas are left. It is the opinion of the sub-committee that Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Portland, and St. Paul are too far north to provide the necessary geographical security. Of the remaining cities, Atlanta meets all the requirements; San Antonio being more than 600 miles from Washington comes next, Omaha and Denver are next and Dallas and Oklahoma City are next.

The attached table shows how this alignment was reached.

Conclusions

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The space sought should have: SECRET

- $\underline{\mathbf{a}}_{ullet}$ Vault storage space sufficient to safeguard the required volume.
- b. Adjoining office space for the work and equipment of the stand-by crow.
- $\underline{\mathtt{c}}_{\:\raisebox{1pt}{\text{\circle*{1.5}}}}$ Earmarkod space for possible immediate expansion to an operating ontity.

An adequate cover story should be prepared prior to reconneissance. This must be adaptable to continuous cover.

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	1 INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL	DISTANCE FROM WASHINGTON	PROXIMITY TO MILITARY	2 GEOGRAPHY	3 COMMUNICATIONS	EXPANDABILITY	4
Atlanta	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
San Antonio	3	5	1	2	2	2	15
Donver	2	6 	2	2	5	3	20
Omaha	4	2	2	3	3	4	18
Dallas	6	4	2	2	4	4	22
Oklahoma Cit	у 5	3	3	2	4	5	22

- 1_{\bullet} $\,$ The least industrial potential is the most desirable site.
- 2. Military vulnerability because of terrain and geographical location.
- 3. Available emergency communications potential.
- 4. Probable availability of supplemental facilities and living quarters.

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